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I. Introduction 
Aristotle’s treatment of aristocracy stands out in the taxonomy of 
constitutions outlined in the Politics as remarkably more elusive than his 
discussion of other forms of government. While in books III-VI the philosopher 
spends considerable time and effort in presenting a systematic account of 
different kinds of monarchy, oligarchy and democracy, he does not seem offer 
an equally wide-ranging picture of the rule by the excellent. Also, his references 
to aristocracy appear scattered throughout the text and do not seem to point to 
an exclusive qualifying criterion shared by any kind of aristocracy. For instance, 
he occasionally speaks of some forms of aristocracy whose core value is public 
concern for ethical excellence1, whereas, on other occasions, he mentions forms 
of government which, although generally labeled as “aristocratic”, show a well-
articulated plurality of values, including wealth, good birth (εὐγένεια), 
education (παιδεία)2 and sometimes even specific modalities of popular 
participation3
This paper contends that Aristotle’s concern is addressed to the normative – 
rather than to the merely descriptive and taxonomic – aspect of the aristocratic
. Such constitutions will vary from each other depending on the 
chosen combination of eligibility criteria and on the priorities accorded to each. 
Within such forms of government, then, ethical excellence appears simply as 
one, and not as the only distinctive feature of aristocracy. 
                                                 
∗ I would like to address special thanks to Dr. Federico Zuolo for his useful and constructive comments on 
this paper.  
1 See Pol. III, 7.1279a35-37; 13.1283b20-21; 15.1286b3-5; IV, 7.1293b1-5; 8.1293b40.  
2 See Pol. III, 12.1283a9-22; IV, 3.1289b40-1290a2; 8.1293b35-38; 8.1294a19-25. See also IV, 4.1291b27-30, 
where Aristotle mentions the notables (οἱ γνώριμοι), who generally hold the highest offices in 
aristocracies, by pointing out that there are kinds distinguished by wealth, good birth, virtue, and 
education. On the plurality of requisites see L. Whibley 1968, 111-112; cf. M.T.W. Arnheim, 1977.   
3 See for instance Aristotle’s treatment of Sparta, Crete and Carthage in Book II of the Politics (sections 9-
12). Cf. Pol. IV, 7.1293b7-18. 
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form of government, and proposes that different levels of normativity are at 
work in Aristotle’s treatment of aristocracy. I begin by examining Politics IV, 7, 
where three different kinds of constitutional forms are sketched out and 
presented as properly aristocratic: (i) a regime made up of those who are best 
simply on the basis of virtue (Pol. IV, 7.1293b1-7); (ii) regimes differing from 
both oligarchy and polity, which Aristotle exemplifies by mentioning Sparta 
and Carthage (Pol. IV, 7.1293b7-18), and (iii) those forms of so-called polity 
which incline more toward oligarchy (Pol. IV, 7.1293b18-21). I propose that only 
two among the three constitutional types outlined at Politics IV.7 possess a 
normative side: the first one, which conveys the idea of a perfect virtue-based 
aristocracy, and the second one, where such an excellence coexists with and 
informs other criteria for political power. 
In the second part of this paper I note that a crucial form of government of 
aristocratic flavour appears to be left out of the picture: a polity which does not 
incline either toward oligarchy or toward democracy, but is rather grounded in 
the presence and stabilizing role of the middle-class. This kind of polity, which 
Aristotle invites the reader to identify as a sort of aristocracy, is introduced at 
Politics IV.11 and presented as the best regime for most cities, championing a 
way of life that does not fall outside the intellectual and ethical range of most 
citizens and that, just for this reason, makes it possible for them to participate in 
the running of the polis. I argue that this is a fourth kind of aristocracy, which is 
not included in Politics IV.7 and discloses a normative factor different from 
those exhibited by the forms of aristocracy outlined in the above mentioned 
section. What approximates it to the level of a well-blended aristocracy is the 
degree of beauty employed in the blending of its political components. 
I shall tease out the various normative aspects of aristocracy through two 
methodological patterns of political analysis that Aristotle himself makes 
available to the reader. The first paradigm, traceable at Politics IV.1, lays down 
the main tasks of political science and prescribes to study (i) the ideal 
constitution; (ii) which regime is fitting for which cities; (iii) the regime based 
on a presupposition; (iv) the regime which is most fitting for all cities. The 
second, which we find enucleated in a short passage of Politics IV.3 (1290a24-
29), proposes a classification of constitutions based on the distinction between 
one or two regimes that are beautifully constituted and their deviations, which 
are described as “deviations from the well-blended harmony as well as from the 
best regime”. I suggest that the “polity of aristocratic flavour” introduced at 
Politics IV.11 can be better understood in its nature and goals in the light of the 
first pattern of analysis, whereas the aristocracies exemplified by Sparta and 
Carthage at Politics IV.7 find conceptual support in the second paradigm.  
 
II. The First Kind of Aristocracy as the Best Constitution in Absolute 
In section 7 of Book IV of the Politics Aristotle lists three kinds and, on the 
whole, four different examples of aristocratic government. As for the first one,
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by referring to unspecified arguments which have already been laid out in the 
text, he speaks of a constitution made up by those who are ἄριστοι in virtue 
conceived in absolute terms 
 
Now it is right to call aristocracy [the regime] we treated in our first 
discourses. Only the regime that is made up of those who are best in 
absolute4
 
 on the basis of virtue, and not of men who are good in relation to 
some presupposition, is justly referred to as an aristocracy; for only here is it 
simply the case that the same person is a good man and a good citizen, while 
those who are good in others are so in relation to their regime (Pol. IV, 
7.1293b1-7). 
The above mentioned passage presents some interpretive problems. In the 
first place, although the qualifying trait of this first type of aristocracy is 
undoubtedly pure virtue, it is not entirely clear whether such a constitutional 
pattern is traceable in existing historical cities or it rather indicates the ideal 
constitution. Secondly, in case the aristocracy at issue were the ideal one, it 
might be wondered whether absolute excellence in such a regime is an 
exclusive prerogative of rulers. 
Aristotle speaks of the first kind of aristocracy in very generic terms, which 
makes it hard to find an uncontroversial solution to the above mentioned 
interpretive issues. His appeal to what he calls “the first discourses” might 
represent the key to our understanding of this first kind of aristocracy. Some 
scholars maintain that, by invoking the “first discourses”, Aristotle is referring 
the reader to Books VII-VIII, where he spends a great deal of effort to lay the 
grounds for the best possible constitution. Their view implies that the original 
position of these books in the text was antecedent to book IV5. An alternative 
possibility is stressed by Barker, who claims that the philosopher expressly 
addresses some remarks contained in Book III, particularly those concerning his 
well-known distinction between the good man and the good citizen and the 
subsequent identification of the virtue of the good man as the one possessed by 
the good ruler in absolute6
On my view, it is primarily to Book III that Aristotle is referring in his 
account of the best form of aristocracy outlined in Book IV. Remarkably 
enough, in the last section of Book III (Pol. III, 18.1288a37-39), he makes use of 
the same expression, i.e. “the first discourses”, by pointing out not only that the 
.  
                                                 
4 The English translation of the Politics I adopt in this paper is C. Lord 1984. Here, however, I have 
modified Lord’s translation of the Greek ἁπλῶς as “simply”, given that in the following lines he opposes 
those who possess virtue ἁπλῶς to those who possess it relatively to some presupposition. The adverb 
“simply” would rather emphasize the distinction between the first kind of aristocracy, which is the one 
grounded on pure virtue, and the remaining two kinds, which include other criteria of political power.     
5 See for instance W.L. Newman 1887-1902; F. Susemihl-R.D. Hicks 1894; J.E.C. Welldon, 1883. See also 
P.L.P. Simpson 1998, xvi-xvii. The same view is held by Lord, although his edition of the Politics retains the 
“traditional” order (see in particular 257, footnote 29).  
6 See E. Barker 1946, 186-187. For a better understanding of his stance see III, 4, particularly 1277a14-16 and 
1277b25-30. 
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main object of concern is the relationship between the virtue of the good man 
and that of the good citizen in the best city, but also and especially that the two 
virtues are one and the same, just as it is reported in Pol. IV, 7. 1293b3-5 with 
respect to the first kind of aristocracy. Nor is it a case that, in Book III, the 
picture of the ideal constitution makes a significant appearance as the 
framework of discussion chosen by Aristotle do set up the identity between the 
authentically virtuous man and the good ruler in absolute7. Assuming that it is 
primarily Book III that Aristotle has in mind while outlining the first kind of 
aristocracy in book IV, how can it help us to understand its nature and the 
implications of the identity between the good man and the good citizen 
established at VI.7? A plausible answer can be found in the emphasis accorded 
in Book III on the relationship between the distinctive virtue of the good citizen 
and that of the good ruler. The core of their distinction lies in the idea that, 
unlike the good citizen, whose distinctive virtue and political commitment 
simply presupposes an unquestioning abidance by the constitutional principles 
in force in his community, the good ruler is fully equipped with wisdom and a 
deliberative capacity informed by ethical excellence8. On the other hand, in the 
ideal city, which Aristotle selects as a suitable frame for his discussion9, the two 
virtues can be conceptually distinct without this preventing an individual from 
possessing both10
As he stresses at Pol. III, 4.1277b11-13, learning how to become a good citizen 
is an indispensable step towards becoming a good ruler, just as it happens in 
the military sphere, where one learns to be a commander of cavalry by serving 
under other commanders
.  
11
 
. Even more forcefully, at Pol. III, 13.1283b42-1284 a2 
he claims that citizens should also be able to rule:  
A citizen in the common sense is one who shares in ruling and being ruled; 
but he differs in accordance with each regime. In the case of the best regime, 
                                                 
7 See Pol. III, 4. 1276b35-37: «By raising questions in a different manner, the same argument [i.e. the issue of 
the virtue of the good citizen and its relation to that of the good man] can be made concerning the best 
regime». 
8 See Pol. III, 4. 1276b28- 1277a20. Among those who emphasize a structural difference between the two 
virtues we find R. Develin (1973), who argues that the excellence of the ruler and the excellence of the 
ruled cannot coincide, not even within the framework of the ideal polis, whose well-being mainly depends 
on a well balanced diversification of functions. A similar view with regard to Book III is held by R. Kraut 
2002, 364-368), although he maintains that in Books VII-VIII the ideal city is described as one in which all 
citizens possess a correct understanding of well-being and have the equipment needed to live an ethically 
virtuous life (186, 359-360). 
9 See footnote 7 above.  
10 I refer the reader to E. Irrera 2012, where the “coexistence thesis” is expounded, that is, the view that the 
virtue of the good citizen in the ideal city is perfectly compatible with a simultaneous possession of ethical 
and intellectual excellence. In other words, each and every citizen of the ideal city would be a potentially 
good ruler.  
11 «But there is also a sort of rule in accordance with which one rules those who are similar in stock and 
free. For this is what we speak of as political rule, and the ruler learns it by being ruled – just as the cavalry 
commander learns by being commanded, the general by being led, and  [similarly in the case of] the leader 
of a regiment or a company».  
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he is one who is capable of and intentionally chooses being ruled and ruling12 with 
a view to the life in accordance with virtue13
 
.  
Although no political community – not even the ideal one - can allow a 
simultaneous exercise of political power on its members’ part, there seems to be 
a possible way of guaranteeing political participation to all: government in 
relays (ἐν μέρει). As Aristotle makes it clear in the context of an investigation of 
the ideal constitution, such a political device is needed among persons who are 
free and equal in nature, for all cannot rule at the same time but each rules for a 
given period of time, so that, as a result, all have a share in ruling activity (Pol. 
II, 2.1261a31-b9)14
The view that the good citizen of an ideal polis can also be a good ruler is 
theoretically sustained by the identity established by Aristotle between the 
virtue of the good citizen and that of the good man in the ideal community. Such 
a view, vaguely foreshadowed at Pol. III, 4
. In fact, such a method of allocation of political honours and 
duties is an appropriate normative response to the following principle: equal 
men should have what is fine (καλόν) and just (δίκαιον) in relays, and to assign 
things unequal to similar individuals is contrary to nature, not to consider that 
nothing contrary to nature is fine (Pol. VII, 3.1325b7-10). 
15, finds its full expression at Pol. III, 
18.1288a36-39. Provided that φρόνησις is the distinctive excellence of the good 
man16
If equality is the underlying ratio of any form of government in relays, in the 
ideal constitution it will then take the form of equality based on virtue, 
provided that, in accordance with the leading principles of the best regime, each 
and every individual committed to ruling activity is expected to possess and 
display authentic φρόνησις
, the virtue of the good citizen, being the same as that of the good man, 
will not consist in mere conformity to the constitution in force, but will display 
itself in an exercise of autonomous deliberative excellence. It is just the latter 
excellence which entitles a good citizen to hold the highest political offices. 
17
δύνασθαι
. On my view, this explains Aristotle’s thought 
that, although the virtue of the good citizen is not the same as the virtue of the 
good ruler, the virtue of a citizen of reputation is held to be the capacity to rule 
and be ruled finely (  καὶ ἄρχεινκαὶ ἄρχεσθαι καλῶς) (Pol. III, 4. 
1277a25-27). Full excellence and deliberative capacity will be required in the 
ideal community even of those who, at a given time, play the role of “simple” 
                                                 
12 Cf. Plato, Laws I, 643e. 
13 A similar position is held at Pol. III, 4.1277a25-27. 
14 On the issue of government in relays see G. Cambiano 2000. Cf. E. Irrera 2012, 145-146. 
15 At Pol. III, 4.1277a14-16 Aristotle asserts that φρόνησις is the distinctive excellence of the good ruler, not 
of the good citizen. At Pol. III, 4.1277a20-21, however, he identifies the virtue of the good citizen with that 
of the good man by presenting it as a hypothesis. If we accept its validity, φρόνησις will be possessed by 
the good citizen as well. 
16 See Pol. III, 4.1277a14-16, mentioned above. 
17 See Pol. III, 4.1277a14-16, 1277b25-26. 
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citizens18
We might now wonder in what respects reference to the “first discourses” 
contributes to clarifying the nature of the “aristocracy of the best people”. This 
kind of aristocracy, which he presents in terms of “the best regime” 
(
; for there will come a time for them to have a share in the highest 
offices. 
τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν, Pol. IV, 7.1293b18-19), is not simply “the best 
aristocracy” among the three listed at Pol. IV, 7, but the best constitution in 
absolute. It is just this sort of constitution that acts as supreme regulative ideal 
for politicians and political scientists. In this respect, it seems to be endowed 
with a high normative worth, which explicates itself in the capacity to show 
what each and every virtuous citizen should be: a potentially good ruler. This 
suggests that aristocracy, being by definition government of the ἄριστοι 
directed to the promotion of the common interest19, is not necessarily modeled 
on the pattern of an asymmetrical relation in terms of virtue between rulers and 
ruled, as it might otherwise happen in particular cases of historical 
constitutions20
As Aristotle says at Pol. IV, 2.1289a31-32, to speak of the ideal polis is 
tantamount to speaking of aristocracy (plausibly the first aristocratic kind 
outlined in Pol. IV, 7). By relating the best constitution in absolute to a specific 
form of government, aristocracy, he gives a well-defined content to a purely 
abstract political category. What emerges from his reference to the “first 
speeches” in Pol. IV, 7 is not the willingness to detach the first aristocracy from 
the historically existing ones, but to specify and give substance to an abstract 
ideal, one which would otherwise risk to be the object of a sterile, utopian 
speculation.  
. 
     
III. Aristocracy as a Well-tempered Constitution.  
If reference to the “first discourses” made in Pol. IV, 7 has helped us to 
understand how the first aristocracy is to be conceived, it nevertheless does not 
explain the relationship subsisting between this first kind of aristocracy and the 
following two. Unlike the former, presented as a constitution based on 
possession and exercise of pure virtue, the latter kinds seem to involve a 
combination of qualities and selection criteria needed to perform a leading role 
in politics. We might wonder, then, whether such constitutions relate to the best 
one, and in what respects they depart from it. I propose that a suitable 
theoretical backup for the task is supplied by Aristotle in Pol. IV, 3. Here, by 
analysing some possible reasons for the existence of a plurality of constitutions, 
he explains that the constitution is an arrangement of offices (ἡ τῶν 
ἀρχῶν τάξις) whose distribution takes place with respect to the political weight 
                                                 
18 Cf. P.L.P. Simpson 1998, 191, 316. 
19 See Pol. III, 7. 1279a35-37. 
20 On the aristocracy based on the superiority of rulers see for instance Pol. III, 4.1288a9-15 and Pol. III, 
18.1288a32-39. 
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(δύναμις) of those sharing in the constitution; constitutions are therefore as 
many as the ways of arranging magistracies in relation to the preeminence and 
the difference of the parts (Pol. IV, 3.1290a7-13). At any rate, as Aristotle is keen 
on emphasizing, it seems that the variety of constitutions can be reduced in the 
last analysis to two distinct kinds: democracy and oligarchy21
 
. By appealing to 
what seems to be a commonsensical view, aristocracy might be envisaged as a 
peculiar form of oligarchy, whereas the polity as a form of democracy. In the 
attempt to exemplify this concept by way of images understandable by anyone, 
he proposes not only the case of various winds that can be substantially 
reduced to two kinds, i.e. the northern and the southern, but also the case of 
different musical modes, which can be reciprocally combined in various ways. 
Emphasis on combination helps the readers’ understanding of a different way 
of thinking of constitutions. In fact, Aristotle explains that, although his 
contemporaries are generally accustomed to conceive of constitutions in this 
way,  
[…] it is truer (ἀληθέστερον) and better (βέλτιον) to distinguish as 
we have, and say that one or two are finely constituted (τῆς 
καλῶς συνεστηκυίας) and the others deviations (παρεκβάσεις) from 
them – deviations from the well-blended harmony 
(τῆς εὖ κεκραμένης ἁ ) as well as from the best regime, the 
more taut [of the harmonies] being oligarchic and more like rule of a 
master, the relaxed and soft being popular (Pol. IV, 3.1290a24-29). 
 
His taxonomy is an alternative more theoretically sustainable and practically 
efficacious than the commonsensical paradigm. By initially exhibiting a 
substantial degree of uncertainty, Aristotle proposes “one or two” constitutions 
in the light of which the others seem to derive their nature as “deviations”. The 
marking trait of the first two is a construction effected “in a beautiful way”. In 
the case of the ideal constitution, the “good construction” stems from the 
adoption of virtue as the qualifying criterion for the exercise of political power 
alongside devices such as the already mentioned government in relays; as we 
have seen in the already mentioned Pol. VII, 3.1325b7-10, the latter is presented 
as “beautiful” and “consistent with nature”. 
Remarkably enough, however, Aristotle invites the reader to look at those 
constitutions which can be regarded as “beautifully structured” even when 
these are not grounded on the promotion of pure virtue. The beauty of the 
regime’s inherent structure, in this second case, seems to come to the surface as 
the outcome and the visible manifestation of a good blending. This implies the 
existence of different qualifying criteria and social groups that do not 
necessarily share by their own nature a prominent concern for the valorization 
                                                 
21 On the polarity between oligarchy and democracy in Aristotle’s times see R. Mulgan 1991, particularly 
311.  
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of virtue in political life; nevertheless, they result liable to be combined with the 
featuring qualities of different regimes thanks to the intervention of a wise 
lawgiver. In that case, the characteristic beauty of this second kind of 
constitution would not lie in any of its constitutive components, but rather in 
the blending itself. In the light of this taxonomic framework, oligarchies will no 
longer appear as suitable normative paradigms after which aristocracies are 
modeled. Vice versa, aristocratic forms of government and, in particular, the best 
one, are presented as a suitable cornerstone in the light of which oligarchies 
appear pure deviations. In a similar fashion, democracies are just deviations 
from the well-blended community, which at Pol. IV, 3.1290a18 is named 
“polity” (πολιτεία)22
As far as the polity is concerned, Aristotle has not yet provided a systematic 
treatment of such a constitutional form, nor has he mentioned the wide variety 
of forms this can take on. In the third book of the Politics, for instance, he simply 
includes it within the group of the right constitutions, that is, those regimes 
which aim at the common interest
.   
23, and confines himself to presenting it as the 
rule by a multitude (πλῆθος) of people who do not possess virtue as a whole, 
but just some part of it, like the military class, whose distinctive virtue is simply 
of military kind24
μίξις
. Elsewhere, it is presented as a mixture of two constitutions, 
namely oligarchy and democracy (8.1293b33-34:  ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ 
δημοκρατίας) or, better said, a mixture of the well off and the poor (μίξις τῶν 
εὐπόρων καὶ τῶν ἀπόρων; 9.1294a16-17)25
If the first kind of constitution enucleated in Pol. IV, 7 corresponds to the 
ideal constitution, the second one seems to incarnate just the kind of well-
tempered constitution described in Pol. IV, 3. Let us then read the passage at 
Pol. IV, 7.1293b7-18:  
. The aspect of polity which 
strengthens the rationale of Aristotle’s argument in Pol. IV, 3 (and makes it 
different from an unspecified “mixture” of various constitutions) is the 
presence of a “virtuous arrangement” of offices and groups. This is suggested 
by the idea that the blending is made “beautifully”, that is, according to some 
kind of proportionality which ensures not only the inherent harmony of the 
polity, but also its stability. This, in turn, presupposes the presence of a wise 
project, that is, one which involves a “phronetic” attitude and possession of the 
typical deliberative capacity of wise lawgivers. What Aristotle mentions as a 
“polity”, then, is a constitution approaching the nature of an aristocracy. 
 
                                                 
22 On the identification of the well-blended constitution with a form of polity, see Simpson’s comment on 
the passage. 
23 See Pol. III, 7.1279a37-1279b5.   
24 On the involvement of the military class in the administration of the polity I refer the reader to E. Irrera 
2010, section V.  
25 Cf. Pol. IV, 8. 1294a23-24, where Aristotle draws a stark distinction between polity and aristocracy by 
specifying that only aristocracy mixes virtue to wealth and freedom, whereas polity is rooted exclusively 
on the mixture of the two latter properties. 
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Nevertheless, there are certain regimes which differ both from those 
that are oligarchically run and from so-called polity, and are called 
aristocracies. For wherever they elect to offices not only on the basis 
of wealth but also on the basis of desert, the regime itself is different 
from both of these and is called aristocratic. For indeed, in [cities] that 
do not make virtue a common concern there are still certain persons 
who are of good reputations and held to be respectable. Wherever, 
therefore, the regime looks both to wealth and to virtue as well as the 
people, as in Carthage, it is aristocratic; and so also those which, like 
the Lacedaemonian regime, look to two alone, virtue and the people 
and where there is a mixture of these two things, democracy and 
virtue.  
 
It is worth noting that, in this second typology of constitution, virtue can be 
employed in the government of a city without being considered as the one and 
only requirement for accessing the highest offices; nor does virtue need to be 
publicly fostered among citizens as a value to cultivate and spread. A similar 
thought seems to reinforce the hypothesis that a polity can include respectable 
and virtuous people in ruling power, even though virtue is not regarded by 
lawgivers a “structural ingredient” of the mixture. The relevant examples put 
forward by Aristotle on this occasion are Sparta and Carthage. Within the 
present framework of discussion, he introduces them as cities which exhibit 
some concern for virtue in ruling power. Sparta, for instance, is described as a 
community whose constitutional nature involves a mixture of virtue and 
popular participation, whereas Carthage as one grounded on a mixture of the 
latter criteria to wealth. Such constitutions, being rooted on a multiplicity of 
presuppositions and qualifying criteria, cannot obviously be regarded as forms 
of a pure aristocracy; nor can they be identified as cases of oligarchy, for what 
oligarchic constitutions make open display of is exclusively wealth26, which is 
championed by those who abide by its principles both as a constituent of their 
personal view of happiness27
                                                 
26 On the various kinds of oligarchy as regimes based on wealth see Pol. IV, 6.1293a12-34. See L. Whibley 
1968.   
 and as criterion for the selection of people to 
public offices. Within oligarchic forms of government, values like education, 
nobility of  birth and deliberative virtue are not attached a prominent role, and 
they can emerge in and affect political life only in a contingent manner, that is, 
without enjoying public recognition. Sparta and Carthage seem rather closer to 
a blended constitution involving virtue. As far as Carthage is concerned, this 
seems to match the constitutional pattern of aristocracy outlined at Pol. IV, 8. 
1294a23-25, that is, the one of a well-blended compound of wealth, popular 
participation and virtue. Wealth is instead omitted in the case of Sparta, which 
is described as rooted in a mixture of virtue and popular participation. 
27 See Book VII, 2.1324a8-10: «Those who ascribe living well to wealth in the case of a single person also 
call the city as a whole blessed if it is wealthy». 
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Assuming the reliability of Aristotle’s account of the Spartan constitution, such 
an omission might be explained by a supposed willingness of lawgivers to 
place higher emphasis on values which might prove factors of stability in a 
well-blended mixture. Desire for wealth, by contrast, might engender 
tendencies and attitudes opposed to virtuous practice, and it might also be a 
cause of internal conflict among the citizens. 
In this respect, Sparta and Carthage can be identified as normative 
paradigms of a well-tempered constitution. Carthage, in particular, might be 
conceived of as a better aristocratic model than the one exemplified by Sparta, 
given that, on Aristotle’s account, it adopts virtue as suitable criterion of 
selection not only of the highest offices, but also of lower ones, i.e. the which 
involve a widespread popular participation28
In the light of the normative model proposed in Pol. IV, 7, the second kind of 
aristocracy, i.e. the one consisting in well-tempered models, is certainly less 
desirable than a perfect aristocracy purely founded on absolute virtue, but this 
is not a good reason to dismiss the second kind as a possible guiding pattern for 
less perfect constitutions, especially for those who are far away from the ideal 
regime. An example of the latter kind of constitution might be represented by 
the third kind of aristocracy mentioned in Pol. IV, 7: a polity inclined towards 
oligarchy (Pol. IV, 7.1293b18-21). It is not clear whether virtue is presupposed 
within the structure of the third aristocracy, as Aristotle rounds off the issue 
very quickly. Considering that in Pol. IV, 3 he has spoken of the generic 
tendency to mistake aristocracy for oligarchy, we might hypothesize that the 
latter kind of aristocracy be intended in the way in it is seen by common 
people
. Also, by keeping the involvement 
of the many in political deliberations in high esteem, Carthage appears a solid, 
well organized constitution (συντεταγμένης), where people acquiesce in the 
arrangement of its principles and no factional conflict arises between different 
social groups (Pol. II, 11.1272b29-33). 
29. In that case, it would not involve virtue and it might be regarded as 
diverging not only from the ideal aristocracy, but also and especially from the 
aristocracy based on a fine blend of qualities. Conceived as a deviation from the 
second kind of aristocracy outlined in Pol. IV, 7, oligarchy might be very close – 
or even identical with - a polity which resorts to expedients designed to reduce 
the multitude’s political weight30
Notably enough, Aristotle does not offer here historical examples to 
elucidate the third kind of aristocracy. This might be due to the fact that he has 
. Although this does not exclude the presence 
of virtuous people in the highest offices, considering that some respectable 
people descend by noble and rich families, virtue would not be publicly 
exhibited as a value of the constitution. 
                                                 
28 See Pol. II, 11.1272b35-37. 
29 See P.L.P. Simpson 1998, 316-317. Cf. R. Mulgan 1977, 70. For a different view see W.L. Newman (1887-
1902, 195-96), who conceives of this third kind of aristocracy as a true one for Aristotle. 
30 On the expedients worked out against popular participation in some polities see Pol. IV, 13.1297a15-35.  
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no interest in presenting it as a model to follow. If such a kind of aristocracy is a 
real deviation, it cannot be taken on as a valid, inspirational model of 
aristocratic constitution. Still, the former kinds of aristocracy will offer it some 
clues on how to modify its underpinnings in the direction of a virtuous blend of 
factors.  
 
IV. A Fourth Kind of Aristocracy 
Having established some possible theoretical connections between sections 3 
and 7 of Pol. IV, it is now time to answer our original question: do the three 
kinds of aristocracy discussed so far exhaust the whole issue about aristocracy? 
I suggest that a plausible answer can be given after consideration of Book IV, 
11. Here, as I believe, Aristotle offers an outline of a form of aristocracy which 
does not match any of the typologies of constitution outlined so far: one fully 
identifiable with a polity primarily grounded on the power of the middle class. 
Another question then arises: if the constitution at stake is a true form of 
aristocracy, why should Aristotle accord it a separate treatment with respect to 
the others? 
In the first place, it should be noted that Aristotle’s discussion of a polity 
based on the rule of the middle class is introduced by Aristotle within a search 
on the kinds of constitution that meet specific requirements, namely those of 
political science. We have already seen how perfect aristocracy turns out to 
coincide with the ideal constitution in absolute. Among other things, this is 
precisely the first kind of constitution that a lawgiver endowed with political 
science should get to know, as we learn from Pol. IV, 1. As we have already 
seen, a lawgiver or politician endowed with political ἐπιστήμη will also know 
what constitution fits different kinds of city, that is, what is the best one in 
given conditions, but also the best under a given presupposition. At this stage 
of our discussion, however, I shall put these three requisites aside and 
concentrate on the fourth and last one: knowledge of the constitution which fits 
most states in general (Pol. IV, 1.1288b33-35). This is an activity of a substantial 
practical import, for such a knowledge should be possessed by the virtuous 
lawgiver committed to an extremely difficult task: that of amending and 
ameliorating the constitution in which he finds himself operating. The wise 
lawgiver ought to introduce an arrangement of such a sort that the ruled could 
easily accept it (Pol. IV, 1.1289a1-3). The prescriptive aspect of such a research 
stands out forcefully in its prominence. 
Only in the following section of the Politics we learn that the kind of 
constitution which Aristotle has in mind is one of aristocratic nature, that is, one 
in which the criterion of desirability is connected to the possibility of being 
applied to the majority of cities:   
 
We must distinguish, first, the number of varieties of regimes, if 
indeed there are several kinds both of democracy and of oligarchy; 
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next, which is the most attainable and which the most choiceworthy 
after the best regime, and if there is some other that is aristocratic 
(εἴ τις ἄλλητετύχηκεν ἀριστοκρατικὴ) and finely constituted 
(συνεστῶσα καλῶς) but fitting for most cities, which it is (Pol. IV, 
1.1289b11-17). 
 
The adjective συνεστῶσα is generally applied to indicate poetical 
compositions made by parts31 καλῶς; in association with the adverb , it 
indicates a fine arrangement of elements, and conveys the idea of a successful 
blending similar to the one emerging from the two patterns of well-temperate 
constitutions spelled out respectively in Pol. IV, 3 and 7.  
When the blended constitution is a non-aristocratic polity, that is, one 
grounded in a simple balance between the rich and the poor, a way to attain its 
distinctive balance is to impart order in such a way that the part of the city that 
wants that constitution is superior to the part that refuses it (Pol. IV, 12.1296b15-
16) or, even better, in such a way that each social class is inclined to endorse the 
preservation of the constitution. A similar case occurs when one thinks that the 
constitution champions the same values by which one abides, i.e. those he 
identifies happiness with. In a well-organized polity each member believes to 
be well-represented, without seriously considering the possibility that people 
belonging to different social classes might fully accept the same constitution 
and perceive an equal sense of satisfaction32
Such a balance, though, proves extremely fragile and precarious, and just a 
few imperceptible moves would be sufficient to allow one part to acquire a 
position of political prominence. Not only in ill-balanced polities, but even in 
aristocratic constitutions do we find that revolutions do burst out because just a 
few people take part in political honours. As Aristotle explains, the starting 
point of a polity’s decline is the lack of a fine blending between democracy and 
oligarchy, whereas that of an aristocracy’s change for the worse is the lack of an 
appropriate mixture between the two above-mentioned elements and virtue 
(Pol. V, 7.1307a5-11). Historically relevant examples of cases like this are Thurii 
and Locris, in which rebellions were undertaken by the δῆμος, as political 
offices and wealth were in the hands of just a few notables. Such things, as 
Aristotle points out, would never have happened in a democracy and not even 
in a well-tempered aristocracy (
. 
ἐν ἀριστοκρατίᾳ εὖ μεμειγμένῃ) (Pol. V, 
7.1307a27-40). 
What is then the connective element between rich and poor that has the 
power to guarantee a stable, and not simply temporary, fine blending? Aristotle 
proposes that it is the political role of the middle class. Such a constitution is the 
                                                 
31 See the verb sunistanai at Poetics, 17.1455a22, 8.1451a29. 
32 A clear example of a well-tempered constitution accepted by anyone is the one in which the polity which 
results from the mixture can be spoken of as either a democracy or an oligarchy (Pol. IV, 9.1294b14-17). Cf. 
E. Irrera 2010, section III; L. Whibley, 1968, 16-17.  
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best not in absolute terms, but only in relation to a way of life which is possible 
for most to participate in. It is also meaningful that, in such a context of 
discussion, Aristotle introduces aristocracy as a benchmark for the 
understanding of the constitutional form under examination. Here, we read that 
there are various kinds of aristocracy, some of which fall outside the range of 
most cities, whereas others approach that form of government named “polity” 
(Pol. IV, 11.1295a31-33). What is most relevant for our purposes is the remark at 
Pol. IV, 11.1295a33-34: “hence we may speak of both as one”. Although far from the 
perfect city, there is still a sense in which the polity Aristotle is going to 
introduce can approximate the level of an imperfect aristocracy. 
In the impossibility to promote a form of government which endorses 
possession and exercise of perfect virtue for each and every citizen, it is still 
legitimate to maximize what constitutes the general character of ethical virtue, 
that is, its being an intermediacy between excess and deficiency. Such an 
intermediacy is not a political solution externally imposed to the city by 
lawgivers, namely the one consisting in the attempt to lead opposed classes to a 
mediation point, but it is one which must be interiorized by individuals, at least 
by those entrusted with political offices of high responsibility. A similar 
constitution is highly unlikely to be entirely formed by moderate citizens, even 
more so because, as Aristotle himself explains, there are three different classes 
of citizens: the extremely rich, the extremely poor and those who stand in-
between them (Pol. IV, 11.1295b1-3). The well-off and the poor will develop 
habits far from a healthy intermediacy just respectively in virtue of their 
excessive possess or lack of material resources. As Aristotle however explains, 
since what is moderate is by general agreement the best, it is evident that even 
in the case of the goods of fortune a moderate possession will be the best, given 
that what is moderate is more well-inclined to obey reason, while for one who 
is exceedingly handsome, strong, well born or wealthy, or the reverse of these 
things, it is difficult to abide by the prescriptions issued by reason (Pol. IV, 
11.1295b3-9). Despite its contingent character, an excessive or defective 
possession of goods, then, either material like wealth or immaterial like beauty, 
strength and nobility, exerts a profound and decisive influence on the shaping 
and the reinforcement of non-virtuous ethical inclinations. More specifically, 
those in possession of an exceeding quantity of goods not only are not well-
inclined to be subjected to the ruled, but are themselves unable to exert ruling 
power in the appropriate way. Those who live in conditions of extreme poverty, 
on the other hand, need the resources, strength and self-confidence required to 
engage in political deliberative process, which is why they appear more well-
inclined to be ruled rather than to rule. Unlike the extremely rich and the 
extremely poor, whoever possesses a moderate quantity of resources is highly 
likely to obey and to exert reason more easily and appropriately (Pol. IV, 
11.1295b9-1296a18). 
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It is reasonable to suppose that, rather than presenting the picture of a state 
entirely constituted of citizens belonging to the middle-class, Aristotle is staging 
a normative model which makes use of the middle-class as its pivotal 
underpinning. The political role of the middle class turns out to constitute a 
balancing power between opposite forces33
 
, that is, as the ideal center of a 
symmetry which, without its presence, would degenerate and slide into 
political disorder and injustice. As Aristotle concludes,  
It is clear, therefore, that the political partnership that depends on the 
middling sort is best as well, and that those cities are capable of being 
well governed in which the middling element is numerous – most 
particularly if it is superior to both [of the other] parts, but if not, 
superior to either of them; for when added to one it will tip the scale 
and prevent the opposing excesses from arising (Pol. IV, 11.1295b34-
39). 
 
As a consequence, it is a truly good fortune for those who are engaged in 
politics to own a middling property, because where some possess too many 
things and others nothing, either an extreme democracy or an unmixed 
oligarchy are doomed to come into being. In the light of such possible 
outcomes, the middling sort of constitution will certainly appear the best, 
because it alone is without factional conflict. In fact, where the middling 
element is numerous, factional conflicts are less likely to occur (Pol. IV, 
11.125b34-1296a2). 
A second aspect which positively affects the outcomes of political activity 
bears on the education endured by wise lawgivers. For it is generally to the 
middle class that belong lawgivers like Solon and Licurgus (Pol. IV, 11.1296a18-
21). The lawgiver coming from the middle class must be aware of the stabilizing 
power of the intermediacy paradigmatically exemplified by his original social 
class, and must convert intermediacy itself into a source of virtuous political 
activity. This is why, as Aristotle points out at Pol. IV, 12.1296b34-38,  
 
The legislator should always add those of the middling sort [to the 
dominant class] in the regime. If he enacts oligarchic laws, he ought 
to aim at the middling sort; if democratic ones, he ought to attach 
these to them. 
 
                                                 
33 As the pivotal underpinning of a well-conducted political community, the middle class cannot emerge 
from a simple combination of the rich and the poor. See for instance J. Frank 2005, 5, who explains that it 
rather emerges «when, on the basis of their self-interests, the few and the many cooperate to their mutual 
advantage to produce a common good that is something more than a aggregation of their discrete self-
interests». Cf. 163-178, where she contends that a middle class can emerge on through an already existing 
friendship within the polity. 
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His activity is the one proper to an arbitrator (ὁ διαιτητής) (Pol. IV, 
11.1297a5), that is, as the author of the fine blending which shapes such a 
constitution. His wise intervention, being firmly grounded in moderate 
attitudes, proves that the fine mixture is not a purely apparent harmony, but a 
stable, structural property of well governed cities, capable of sorting out 
beneficial effects both on political life itself an on the members of the 
community. The better the mixture in the polity, Aristotle says, the more lasting 
it will be. It is also indicative that  
 
Many of those who want to set up aristocratic regimes as well [as 
polities] thoroughly err not only by the fact that they distribute more 
to the well off, but also by deceiving the people. For in time from 
things falsely good there must result a true evil, and the 
aggrandizements of the wealthy are more ruinous to the polity than 
those of the people (Pol. IV, 13.1297a7-13). 
 
A good blending relying on the middle class might certainly be effected by 
some members of the middle class, but a simple good propensity to moderation 
is not sufficient. For, as Aristotle has already stressed in Book III, the good ruler 
should be equipped with φρόνησις. Such a virtue, being accompanied by the 
rest of ethical virtues34, will secure the right step in deliberative processes at the 
political level. It is just this virtue, presupposing a correct reason (ὀρθὸς λόγος), 
which causes lawgivers to think of the middle class as a potential 
counterbalancing power in the polity. Placing moderate individuals in strategic 
political offices will prove a successful strategy for both a good blending and its 
stability35
Besides stressing an expediential aspect of the search for a good order and 
stability in the city, Aristotle’s argument on the well-ordered city invites us to 
believe that there is also an “aesthetical” reason in support of a fine blending of 
political components. As we have seen with respect to Pol. IV, 3, the mixture of 
parts in a well-tempered constitution is realized “in a beautiful way” (
. 
καλῶς), 
and so is a polity so well-organised that it can be called both a democracy and 
an oligarchy (Pol. IV, 9.1294b13-17). This may allow us to view a hypothetically 
perfect polity, that is, one that can be regarded as a kind of aristocracy, in terms 
of a regulative ideal36
                                                 
34 On the connection between φρόνησις and the rest of ethical excellences see NE VI, 13.1145a6-7. 
 capable of inspiring virtuous lawgivers and politicians 
committed to political activity in deviant constitutions, especially when the 
35 As Aristotle explains at Pol. V, 1.1302a13-15: «Moreover, the regime made up of the middling elements is 
closer to the [rule of] the people than to [rule of] the few, and this is the most stable of regimes of this 
sort».  
36 This point is well emphasised by C.J. Rowe 2000, 367-368. With reference to Pol. IV, 1 Rowe explains that 
Aristotle himself clearly says that «writing about the ‘best absolutely’ and saying what is ‘of practical use’ 
are not only compatible, but are actually both to be properly regarded as parts of the business of political 
philosophy’» (367).    
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well-articulated blend on which it is based involves a substantial participation 
of people belonging to the middle class. 
This is why a polity which manages to satisfy both the need of beauty and 
that of stability can be identified as an aristocracy proper37
 
. We can therefore 
speak of a fourth kind of aristocracy, that is, one which Aristotle is keen on 
keeping separate from the others in virtue of its peculiarly paradigmatic nature. 
As a constitution approachable by most communities, such a kind of aristocracy 
possesses a higher practical relevance than the ideal constitution itself, 
representing a pattern to be emulated by wise lawgivers.  
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